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MISSION AND SCIENCE PLANNING
Scientific Input to Site Selection
Early consideration of lunar exploration missions by the scientific
community focused more sharply on what should be done on the moon than
on where it would be done. The 1962 Iowa summer study paid particular
attention to the scientific qualifications and training of the
astronauts; the 1965 Woods Hole study formulated a list of 15 important
scientific questions to be addressed by lunar exploration, which would
define the experiments to be conducted. [see
Chapter 3] [see Appendix 3]
Neither conference expressed any preference for landing sites, although
both pointed out the need to study highlands as well as maria. The Woods
Hole study report concluded that really effective geophysical and
geochemical studies would require investigations at several locations up
to 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) apart.13
NASA had apparently made it quite clear to its outside scientific
advisors that science would have to take its results from wherever it
could get them - at least on the first few missions. The point was
implicitly acknowledged at the Falmouth conference on lunar exploration
immediately following the 1965 Woods Hole study. All of the
earth-science study groups at Falmouth stressed the need to supplement
manned exploration with detailed study by unmanned lunar-orbiting
satellites to secure comprehensive scientific coverage of the lunar
surface.14 To a considerable degree
this emphasis on unmanned studies was simply a recognition of the
relative cost-effectiveness of the two modes of exploration, but it was
also a recognition of the operational limitations of Apollo and the
resultant restrictions on landing sites. Even looking ahead to longer
stays on the moon, the groups urged development of surface vehicles and
flying vehicles to increase the effective range of exploration but did
not mention any need to extend the limited Apollo landing zone. It was
assumed that operations could eventually be extended to higher latitudes
and more difficult sites, such as highlands and craters - possibilities
included in NASA's plans for extending Apollo,15 which the Falmouth participants used as the
basis for their recommendations.
The fact was that in mid-1965 it was simply too early for scientific
priorities to be included in the selection of Apollo landing sites.
Better information on the lunar surface was needed, and better
understanding of the operational constraints on landing sites, before
the scientific merit of any particular site could have any effect on the
choice.
13. National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council, A Review of Space
Research, report of the summer study conducted under the auspices
of the Space Science Board at the State University of Iowa, June 17-Aug.
10, 1962, NAS-NRC Publication 1079 (Washington, 1962); idem, Space
Research: Directions for the Future, report of a study by the
Space Science Board, Woods Hole, Mass., 1965, NAS-NRC Publication 1402
(Washington, 1966).
14. NASA 1965 Summer Conference on
Lunar Exploration and Science, Falmouth, Massachusetts, July 19- 31,
1965, NASA SP-88 (Washington, 1965), passim.
15. House, Subcommittee on Manned Space
Flight of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1966 NASA
Authorization, hearings on H.R. 3730, 89/1, pt. 2, pp. 278-85.
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